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I. - The Constitutional and Political Problem.
The financial reconstruction of China is not primarily a financial problem. 
It is a constitutional and political question, the solution of which lies in the read­
justment of the relations between the Pr vinces and the Central Government. 1 
The Manchu regine had evolved an elaborate and well balanced system of 
internal administration which left to the Provinces a large autonomy, whilst 
affirming the super-ior authority of the Throne. All offit:!ials down to the Magis­
trate were appointed from Peking, under two very stri_ct rules, viz.: 1° that no 
person could hold office in his native province, and 2° that the term of office was 
limited to three ye�rs, with only one possible extension. The Govern­
ment was very careful to select as Viceroys or Governors personages devo­
ted to the Imperial Family, and, in the distribution of offices, to keep the 
balance even between Chinese and Manchu�, as well as between the various 
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provincial parties or clans. The consequence was that the governing body of a 
Province would always consider themselves as representing the Central 
Government, and would not think of identifying with the populati0n under their 
control, or supporting provincial interest against Imperial prerogative. Their 
task was facilitated by the granting of wide powers which enabled them to 
settle direct most of the local questions. Once the Imperial authorities in 
Peking were satisfied with the loyalism of the holders of the main official posi­
tions, they would leave them a free hand in the administration of the
1 
province, 
provided only that the taxes and provincial contributions be duly remitted every 
year to the Central Treasury. 
When additional revenue was required for meeting new obligntions, in­
ternational or domestic, an equitable understanding would always be reached, 
tae provinces showing the same consicterntion for the need:; of the Central 
Government as Peking would show for the local intc:rests. 
The foundations of the system were shattered by the 1912 revolution. The 
whole structure was built on the d�vot.ion of the Viceroys and Governors to the 
Emperor. The Emperor abdicated. MoRt of the high officials resigned or dis­
appeared. A Provisional Republican constitution w..is promulgated which treated 
China as a highly centralized State, thus ignoring the main constitutional problem 
of the country. The Central Govornment was left unarmerl, with practically no 
power of control over the provincial authorities, whilst the provinces were being 
given local Assemblies though which they could develop separatist tendencies. 
The old machinery kept in motion for some time, but soon the provincial chiefs, 
whether Civil Governors, or Military Governors, or General Inspectors, found that 
it was more profitable to side with the Provinces than with the Central Govern­
ment, seeing that in fact the money was coming from the Provinces and that 
it was easier for the provinces to live apart of the Central Government than 
for the Central Government to dispense with the support of the Provinces. 
Thus developed the present condition of affairs. It cannot improve 
materially unless the nature of the relations between the Central Government 
and the Provinces be clearly defined (which is the constitutional side of the 
problem), and unless the new distribution of power between the Provinces and 
the Central Government is accepted by the provincial nuthorities or forced upon 
them (which is the political side of the problem). No reduction of the army, 
no- disbandment of the superfluous soldiery is worth being undertaken so long as 
the Tuchuns, Civil Governors, or other such provincial chiefs can defy the 
orders of the Government, seize the revenue, and recruit fresh troops at their 
own wi11. Neither can the finances of the G�vrrnment be put on a sound basis 
if the proceeds of Government taxation continue being appropriated by the local 
military or civil authorities. 
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II._:_ The Comparative Situation of China. 
Happily for China, the resources of the country are so great and the 
charges so light that even a moderate improvement in the political situation 
would remove many of the financial difficulties. 
With more than 400 millions inhabitants, it is d�:mbtful whether the gov­
ernmental, provincial and local taxation in China proper exceeds 500 million 
dollars a year, an average of $1,20 per head. It is almost nothing when compared 
with taxation in the other parts of the world. Precise figures cannot be worked 
out becau e of the fluctuations in the rates of exchange and because the budgets 
of most of the forejgn Power� are still subject to important variations from year 
to year. But a rough calculation, which is quite sufficient for our purpose, shows 
that the annual per capita revenue derived from taxes and duties in the 
fo1Jowing countrie�, r duced into silver, amounts to: 
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • $ 170 
· France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . $ 90 
Italy ............................ ............................ $ 24 
Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 30 
United States (Federal taxation only) ........................ $ 120 
Of course, fully developed States of Europe anrl America can pay higher 
taxation than China. But turning to th?. countries of Asia which are lying on 
the coHst of the Pacific and whose conditions may- compare with those obtaining 
in China, the figures are, per capita:
Janan ..................................... · ................. $ 16,00 
Philippines .................................................. $ 7,50 
French Indochina ............................................ $ 5,50 
Siam ........................................................ $ 9,50 
Dutch East Indies .......................................... $ 15,00 
The Chinese average of $ 1,20 is about one fifth of the average 
taxation paid in French Indochin:-i, and one e�ght of the average 
taxation paid in Sfam. Yet, the population of China is more indus­
trious, more hard working, and has more resources, agricultural, com­
mercial, industrial and mineral than the population of French Indochina or 
Siam. The Chinese nation feels the burden of taxation not so much because it 
is excessive' than because the system is cumbersome, because it works injustice 
on many classes of citizens, because it is made the pretext for all sorts of malprac-
- 4 - .
tices, and Rbov0 all because the taxpayer is given very littl.e in return for what 
he pays. If slightly reformed and propej:-}y controlled, and if its proceeds were 
used for the real benefit of the people, a nett revenue of nearly 450 millions 
dollars could easily be collected. 
National debts are at present a crushing burden on most of the European 
and American Powers. Their per capita ratio reaches appalling figures in 
several countries: 
Great Britain ..... , ............. _ ............... .... ·....... $ 1,440 
France ................... : . ............................ ..... $ 1,310 
United States (Federal debt only) ............................ $ 433 
Belgium ....... � ..... : ........ , ............................. $ 312 
I ta I.v • • . • . • • , . • . . • . . . . . . • . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . ,. . • . . . • . • • • $ 190 
Japan ......... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 50 
Now, the present public r:lebt of China, domestic and foreign (exclusive of 
railway debts which are not included in the above foreign �tatistics) is under 
1,900 millions silver dollars, or Four Dolfo1·s Seventy Fi vc ce11ts per head, 
two hundred and fifty times less than the per capita ratio of the Briti3h and 
French public debt. 
The service of the secured Chinese debts, domestic and foreivn, requires at 
the most 95 millions dollars a vear. The consolidation of the unsecured debts, as 
shown below, may rPquire dU:ring the next year� from 40 to 45 million� a year. 
That is to say a maximum grand total of 140 millions dollars per year leaving 
300 millions. or 25 millions per month, for the governmental, provincial and 
local expenditure. This is quite enough for making a start in efficient admin­
istration and balancing a reasonable budget. More money will of course be soon 
required for police, education, hygiens, agriculture, trade and otherwise 
fostering the economic development of the country. A few reforms in taxation (
would at once bring in the necessary revenue seing that for every te11 ceuts
increace in the pe,� capita ratio the Treasury would receive an additional 40 
millions dollars a year. 'J,. 
III. -The unsecured indebtedness.
The first step towards financial reconstruction is the settlement of the 
present unsecured indebtedne�s of the Chinese Government. For some of these 
debts the creditors have succt!eded in getting irregula1· payments. For most of . • 
them neither interest nor capital had been paid for one year or more. The 
situation affects the local financial market, since all the Chinese Banks are on 
the list of the creditors and are badly in need of the mon�y owing to them. It 
affects still more the credit of China at home and abroad. It blocks every possible 
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attempt of the Chinese Goverbment to raise loans for constructive pur1l0ses at 
rei.sonable rates. It puts the Ministry of Finance in the most difficult position. 
Some sort of remedy must be found if national bankruptcy is to be avoided. 
In the statistics compiled in October 1922 by the Ministry of Finance, the
unsecured indebtedness is reported as follows, interest being calculated up to 
the end of the year 1922 :
Unsecured domestic loans • • • • • • . . . . • • • • . $ 132,660,000 
Unsecured foreign loans • . . • . . . . . . . . . . 239,930,000 
Chinese Banks short term debts as approved by the Redemption 
Commis�ion. . · • . . . . • . . . • ! • 
Treasury Notes. . . . . . . • • • • 
Chinese Banks short term debts . 
84,500,000 
33,700,000 
48,250,000 
'fotal . . • . . . . • $ 488,940,000 
To this total must be added: 
The amount due under the renewed Austrian Loan agreement. 
The agreement seems to have been cancelled, but the money is 
nevertheless still owing to the present bondholders . . . . £ 
Interest on the whole of the unsecured debt up to July 1923, no 
settlement of the consolidation question being possible before 
that date. . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . ·$ 
5,200,000 
25,000,000 
The calculations for nxchange in the statistic� of the Ministry of Finance 
are not quite safe. The sterling is reckoned at 8 dollars to the pound, whilst 
the present rate is 9. The rate adopted for the yen is also too low. A conserva­
tive estimate would work as follows: 
P,·iucipal 
Debts in silve,· doi/a,·s or T�el.3 redui:!ed into silver dolJar.9 . . . 8 284,588,000 
Debts i11 steding • . • • • • • • • . . . £ • 3,136,000 
Plus Austrian Loans . . . •. • • . £ 5,200,000 
Total . • • . • . • • • . . . • £ 8,336,000 
at $9 to the pound • . . • • . 
Debts i1z f1·a11cs. • . • Fcs 167,500,000 
at fcs 7 to the dollar . . • • . • . • . 
Debts iu yens. . . . . 
at S0.90 to the yen. 
Debts iu gold do/!an • 
at $1.90 to the GD.
. Y 162,655,000 
. GD 12,342,000 
75,024,000 
23,927,000 
146,389,000 
Total • 
23,468,000 
$ 508,396,000 
-- 6 -
Interest 
Interest up to December 81st 1922. . • • 
Interest from January to June 1923. 
Grand Total. . . • . • • • .
$ 41.000,000 
25,000,000 
$ 569,396,000 
The unsecured indebtednes3 of the Chinese G::>Vernment, asit will stand by the 
middle of the year 1923 may be accordingly put, in round figuras, at 570 millions 
dollars. A large part of the capital of such indebtedness has already matured 
or wrn soon matura. Interest is aho in arrear3. There ii no hope of finding 
sufficent money to satisfy the creditora according to the original contracts. It 
might even prove impossible to pay thern were time only granted, because part of 
the money has been· borrowed at such high rates that the accumulated interest 
would exceed· the future available resources of the Government. Consolidation is 
imperative as the only way out the difficulty. 
Consolidation, as a general proposition, means the redemption of the exis­
ting debts through the issue of new bonds, the substitution of new bonds for the 
-old ones involving:
1) an extension of time for the short terms debts,
2) a reduction of the interest in every case where excessive rates have been
charged, 
3) as a compensation for such extension of time and reduction of interest,
the granting of adequate securities. 
Consolidation will be a surcess if sound and reliable security is offered. Cre­
ditors whose debts are overdue, or whose debts are shortly to mature, and cre­
dito�s entitled to high rates of interest under their contracts will certainly agree 
to accept, in exchange for what is due to them, long term bonds bearing a rea­
sonable rate of interest if payment of interest and repayment of capital are 
fully guaranteed, that is to say if the pledged revenue is sufficient and sufficient­
ly controlled to secure complete payment of coupons and amortizati'ln of the new 
bonds on due dates. 
IY.-The Customs Revenue. 
The better the security China can offer her unsecured creditors, the better 
the terms of the consolidation will be for the Chinese Government. 
The best security in China is the revenue of the maritime and native cus­
toms under the control of the Inspector General. 
-- -- -... -- ---- ,..... 
"' 
de 
mi 
0,000 
),000 
6,000 
y the 
llions 
mred 
1ding 
3. It
lrt of 
:erest 
.ion is 
exis­
>r the 
! been
erest, 
, Cre­
d ere­
agree 
area­
l are 
cient­
e new 
better 
� cus-
Is it possible to secure the consolidation of an indebtedness of about 5 
millions dollars on the revenue uf the Customs ? 
In order to answer the question, let us figure what the.future nett reven 
of the Custome is likely to be. By nett ,·evenue is meant the revenue availab 
for loans and indemnities after the ordinary and extraordinary administrati 
expenses of the Customs service have been met. 
The nett revenue ·of the Customs for the year 1922 amoanted in rou 
figures: 
For the Maritime Customs, to • • 
For the Native Customs. to • 
Total . . . . . 
or in dollars at the rate of 73 • 
say Seventy seven millious dollars. 
• • • Sh. Taels
• Sh. Taels
• Sh. Taels
52,150,00 
4,200,00 
56,350,0 
77,191,5 
The increase to the full 5% which has come into force on the 17th of Jan 
ary 1923 will work only during part of the present year, all goods having le 
foreign ports prior to such date being charged the old t�riff. It may be expect 
however to give 8 millions dollars in 1923 and 10 millions dollars in 1924. 
The raising of the import tariff from 5 % to 7 ½ % for ordinary goo 
and to 10 % for luxuries may yield 28 millions. As it is unlikely that it m 
work in 1923, let us reckon it from 1924 only. 
Besides, there is a gradual increase of revenue resulting from the natur 
development of trade. From 1911 to 1922 the average increase has been t 
millions taeb a year. From 1917 to 1922 it is more .than three millions taels 
year. From 1919, after the last tariff revision, to 1922, it is over four millio 
taels a year. It is steadily increasing, and with a tariff to be raised from 5
to 7 ½ and 10 % we may safely anticipate it to be three millions dollars (Ta 
2,200,000) a year for the next five yearg (from 1923 to 1927). After 1927 
may figure it for another ten years at two millions dollars a year. 
Working on those data, the probable nett future revenue of the Custo 
may be calculated as follows: 
For the year 192� : 
Nett revenue of 1922 • • • • • • • • • • 
Increase from the fulJ 5 % during part only of the year ., • 
Increase from development of trade. • • • • • • • • • 
77,000,0 
8,000,0 
3,000,0 
Total • • • • • • • • • • • • . . S 88,000,0 
For the year 1924. 
Nett r�ven ue of 1923 
- 8 -
' . . . • $ 88,000,000
Increase from the full 5% during the whole of the year . . . 
Increase from new 7½ and 10% tariff . . . . . .. . . . 
Increase from development of trade 
2,000,000 
28,000,000 
3,000,000 
Total. . . 
For the year 1925: 
Nett revenue of 1924 
Increase from development of trade . • 
-T:;tal
For the year 1926: 
Nett revenue of 1925 
Increase from development of trade . 
Total. . . 
For the year 1927: 
Nett revenue of 1926 
Increase from .development of trade . 
1,otal 
For the year 1928: 
Nett revenue of 1927. 
Increase from development of trade . 
Total. . . . . . . • . . . 
and so on till the nett revenue reaches. 
.• $ 121,000,000
• $ 121,000,000
3,000,000 
• $ 124,000,000
• $ 124,000,000
3,000,000 
. $ 127,000,000 
. $ 137,000,000 
3,000,000 
. $ 130,000,000 
• . $ 130,000,000
2,000,000 
• • $ 132,000,000
• $ 150,000,000
But the nett revenue of the Customs is already earmarked for the service of 
the foreign loans of 1895, 1896 and 1898, of the Boxer lnd"mnities, of the Reor­
ganization Loan of 1913 anct of various domestic loans. 
r he following table shows what is required for meeting 
obligations. 
,. 
Ill.• ..,. 
·-
-· 
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The figures of the foreign loans have been compiled from the official tablesof interest and amortization attached to the original loan contracts.The Boxer Indemnity is calculated at 50 % of its outstanding amount, thatis to say less the German, Austrian and Russian shares, with the furtherassumption that the deferred annuities of the years 1917-1922 are postponed to1941-1�45. 
Sterling is calculated at 10 dollars to the pound.
The domestic Joans are tabulated in accordance with the official figurespublished by the Ministry of Finance.
Table I 
Table 1 
I Russo-·French 1· Anglo-German I Anglo-German I 
Years loan loan loan 
1 895 ' 1 896 ' 1 898 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
to 
1960 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
8.366.700 
9.521.000 
9.513.000 
9.505.000 
9.497.000 
9.489.000 
9.480.000 
9.470.000 
9.460.000 
9.450.000 
9.440.000 
$ 
8.277.000 
8.274.000 
8.270.000 
8.267.000 
8.263.00f) 
8.259.000 
8.255.000 
8.250.000 
8.246.000 
8.241.000 
8.236.000 
8:231.000 
8.225.000 
8.220·.ooo 
8.214.000 
8.208.00C, 
8.201.000 
8.194.000 
8.18'7.000 
8.180.000 
8.172.000 
Boxer 
Indemnity 
1 901 
18.370.000 
18.370.000 
18.370.000 
18.370,000 
18.370.000 
18.370.000 
18.370.000 
18 370.000 
13.370.000 
26.500.000 
26.500.000 
26.500.000 
26.500.000 
26.500.000 
26.500.000 
26.500.000 
26.000.000 
:W.500.000 
18.300.000 
18.300.000 
18.300.000 
19.300.000 
18 300.000 
Reorgaiird Year 
lion LcLoan 
191�1914 
$ 
13.50(500.000 
15.00(000.000 
1s.oo<ooo.ooo 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
lJ.000 
15.000 
15.000, 
l 5.0�0.
15.000
15.000
15.00
15.000,
15.000,
15.00
15.00 
15.00, 
15.00C. 
15.00C, 
GES 
I 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
lJ.000 
15.000 
· 15.000
500.000 15.0�0
500.000 15.000
500.000 15.000
000.000 15.000
500.000 15.000
300.000 15.000
300.000 15.000
.300.000 15.000
.300.000 15.000
300.000 15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
15.000 
I Fourth Vear 
Loan 
1915 
$ 
5.700.000 
. . . . . .
. . . . . � 
. . . . . . 
REVENUE 
Fifth Year 
Loan 
1916 
$ 
1.125.455 
1.125.455 
1.125.455 
4.251.720 
7.096.621 
6.720.469 
3.320.052 
. . . . . .
. . . . . . 
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
I Seventh Year I Consolidated I Eleventh Vear j Loan Loan · Loan 1918 1921 1922 
$ $ $ 
2.700.000 20.435�284 2.760.000 
2.700.000 19.627.657 2.600.000 
2.700.000 19.861.806 2.400.000 
2.700.000 21.644.251 2.280.000 
2.700.000 12.728.154 2.120.000 
7.132.500 12.095.824 
6.862.500 11.463.494 
6.n92.500 10.831.164 
6.322.500 
6.052.500 
5.782,500 
5.512.500 
5.242.500 
4.972.500 
4.702.500 
... .. .. 
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Table II gives the total of the charges on the 
the charges for foreign obligations 
rate of ten dollars to the pound. 
___ ,.__ .....,.__ - -.,J - -
l ,
Ta 
in dollars, 
Iver at the TOTAL CHARGES ON CUSTOMS REVENUE 
Years 
Foreign Internal 
Total Obligalior.s Loans 
$ $ $ 
1923 58.034.700 36.220.739 94.255.43 
1924 59.523.700 32.053.112 91.576.81 
1925 59.511.700 29.127.260 88.638.96 
1926 59.500.700 30.875.971 90.376.67 
1927 59.488.700 24.644.775 84.133.47 
1928 59.473 700 25.948.793 85.422.49 
1929 59.461.700 21.646.046 81.107.74 
1930 59.446.700 17.423.664 76.870.36 
1931 59.366.000 6.322.500 65.688.50 
1932 59.201,000 6.052.000 65.253.50 
1933 49.756.000 5.782.500 55.538.5 
1934 4ri_751.ooo 5.512.500 55.263,5 
1935 49.745.000 5.242.500 54.987.50 
1936 49.640.000 4.972.500 54.612.50 
1937 49.634.000 4.70�.500 54.336.50 
1938 49.628.000 .. .. .. 49.628.00 
1939 49.621.000 . . . . . . 49,621.0 
1940 49.614.000 49.614.0 
1941 41.487.000 41.487.0 
1942 41.480.000 .. .. .. 41,480.0 
Hl43 41.472.000 41,472.0 
1944 33.300.000 33.300.0 
1945 33.300.000 33.300.0 
1946 15.000.000 15.000.0 
1947 
to 15.000.000 15.000.0 
1960 
1961 nil nil 
1962 nil nil 
e II 
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Comparing now the figures in Table II with the figures of the probable 
future revenue of the Customs, as we have worked them out, Table III shows 
which nett balance may be available for consolidation purposes. 
Table Ill 
:·•� 
" 
.r:::i. 
II 
;� II 
f;-
� 
_..., 
I, 
'·'i 
I, 
: 
Table Ill 
BALANCE AVAILABLE FOR CONSOLIDATION 
(In round.figures) 
Years Nett Revenue . I Charges I 
-! 
$ :1:: Ir $ 
1923 88.000.000 94.250.000 
1924 121.000.000 91.500.000 
1925 124.000.000 ,, - 88.700.000 
1!126 127.000,000 90.500.000 
]927 130.000.000 84.lJ0.000 
1928 132.000.000 85.500.000 I• 
1929 134.000.000 1, 81.100.000 
1930 136 000.000 77.000.000 
1931 13 .000.000 66.000.000 
1932 140.000.000 65.000.000 lo 
1933 142.000.000 55.500.000 I 
1934 144.000.000 ,, 55.500.000 
1935 146.000.000 55.000.000 
1936 148.000.000 55.000.000 
1937 150.000.000 54.500.000 
1938 150.000.000 50.000.000 
1939 150.000.000 50.000.000 
1940 150.000.000 50.000.000 
1941 150.000.000 41.500.000 
1942 150.000.000 41.500.000 
1943 150.000.000 41.500.000 1, 
1944 150.000.\. 00 33.500.000 
1945 150.000.000 33.500.000 
1946 150.000.000 15.000.000 
1947 
to 150.000.000 15.000.000 
1960 
1961 150.000.000 nil 
Deficit 
$ 
6.250.000 
. .
. . 
. . 
. . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . . .
. . . .
. .
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. .
. .
. .
. .
. . . .
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. .
. .
. .
. .
. . . . . . 
. . . . . .
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . . .
. . 
. . 
. .
. .
. . .. . 
. . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
,· 
Surplus 
. . 
$ 
. . . . 
29.500.000 
35.300.000 
36.500.000 
45.850.000 
46.500.00() 
52.900.000 
59.000.000 
72.000.000 
75.000.000 
86.500.000 
88.500.000 
91.000.000 
93.000.000 
95.500.000 
100.000.000 
100.000.000 
100.000.000 
108.500.000 
108.500.000 
108.500.000 
116.500.000 
116.500.000 
135.000.000 
135.000.000 
150.000.000 
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It appears from Table III that a 6,250,000 dollars deficit i� to be foreseen
for the year 1923, but that there will be a surplus balance of 80 millions dollars
in 1924, regularly increasing each year till it reaches 72 millions dollars in 1931.
The increase in the balance is due to a large extent to the total of the existing
charges dropping from 94,250,000 dollars in 1923 to 66 millions in 1213 and to
. 55 millions in 1933. 
It seems therefore that a consolidation scheme may be based on the Customs 
Revenue, provided: 
a) that means be devised to find some additional funds during the first
years, and 
b) that interest onlv_ on the consolidation bonds be paid up to 1931, red­
emption beginning in 1932.
The available surpluses from 1932 onwards are sufficient to secure amortiz­
ation in a short period of time.
V.-A Consolidation Scheme 
A mere �lance at the tables of the Chinese Foreign and Domestic indebted­
ness, as published in October 1922 by the Ministrv of Finance, shows that the 
indebtedness consists of a variety of debts, few loans totalling more than ten 
mil1ions dollars, and most of them being loans of less than one miJlion dollars. 
The currencies are different, some of the debts being in silver dolhrs, some in 
sterling, some in yens, some in francs, etc. The rates of interest and the dates 
or periods of repayment also widely differ. It seems impossible to con�olidate 
such a mass of heterogeneous obligations with bonds in one single currency, 
bearing all the same rate of interest, and redeemable under the same conditions. 
With regard to the currency, there can be no question of converting the 
domestic debts in dollars into bond� in a foreign currency. On the other hand, if 
creditors of debts in foreign currencies are offered bonds in silver dollars, they 
will point out that the conversion of sterlin2 or gold dollars into Chinese currency 
involves a risk, and that they will not accept the risk unless conversion is made at 
a higher rate that the then prevailing exchange quotation. A creditor in sterling 
for instance may request that his debt be converted into dollars at the rate of 
eleven to the pound when t�e market rate is nine only, and so on. The best 
system, to avoid discussions and losses for the Government, would be to issue as 
many sets of new bonds as there are different kinds of currencies employed in 
the loan agreements, say one set in chinese dollars, one set in sterling, one set in 
francs, etc., and to off er dollar bonds to the dollar creditors, sterling bonds to the 
sterling creditors, franc bonds to the franc credito1 s, etc. 
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The next point is interest. Most of the unsecured debts bear interest at the 
rate of 8% or over. In substitution for them, well secured bonds guaranteed on 
the revenue of the Customs ought to be accepted at lower rates, coupled with a 
reasonable redemption pre!llium, for instance 7% bonds issued at 87 ,50 and 
redeemable at 100. But several of the unsecured debts have been contracted at 
better terms for China, e. g. the Loans of the Chicago Bank and of the Pacific 
Development Co at 6%, the French Industrial Loan of 1913 at 5%, the War 
Participation Loan at 7%. For the 7% loans, 7% bonds ought to be offered at 
par. As to the 6% and 5% loans, the original terms ought to be preserved 
or new bonds issued at 6% and 5% • 
So much the same for the periods of redemption. The 1913 French Indus­
trial Loan is r�deemable in 34 years beginning from 1930. There is no reason 
to alter the original schedule and to substitute for jt a shorter period of amortiza• 
tion For other loans it may be advisable sometimes to off er bond� redeemable 
in a longer period. This may facilitate negotiations since the Government has 
no power to impose consolidation ·and must discuss terms with each creditor. 
Taking into consideration the following facts: 
a) that part of the unsecured indebtedness bears interest at less than 8%;
b) that when rates over 8% were agreed it was on account of the risk
involved in lending money to the Government without proper securities, and that 
once adequate security is furnished the excPssive rates must be lowered; 
c). that the capital of some of the debts may be reduced, since it is dispro• 
portionate with the amounts actually received by the Treasury; and 
d) that among the unsecured debts are $33,700,000 Treasury Notes which
the holders never expected to be redeemed in full and on which a substantial 
rebate may be imposed, 
it seems that the tot::il unsecured indebtedness of the Chinese Government, 
as it wm staud by the end of 1923, may be met by the issue of consolidation 
bonds to a nominal amount not exceeding 625 millions dollars, bearing interest 
at 7% pe1� year from October 1st 1923, the first semi-annual coupon being paya• 
ble on April 1st 1924. 
The calculation is based on the assurr.ption tha� the Commi3sion to which the 
Washington Agreements have entrusted the duty to establish the 2½ Customs 
surtax will meet and reach a decision before the end of the year. 
Now the service of rnterest and amorti
:z.
ation in twelve years of a nominal 
capital of 625 millions dollars bearing interest at 7% requires 977,814,000 a 
year. 
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· Interest alone requires $43,750,000 a year. 
If it is to run from Octobre 1923
he charge for the year 1923 will be$ 10,937,
500.
From Table III it appears that amortization can
not begin prior to 1932, the
urpluses from 1923 till 1931 being sufficient to pay
 interest only. 
Table IV shows how the scheme can work:
TABLE 
obre 1923 
1932,the Tab, 
TABLE SHOWING SERVICE OF A CONSOLIDATION 7° / 0 LOAN OF 625 MIL 
DOLLARS NOMINAL REDEEMABLE IN TWELVE YEARS FROM THE 
Vear 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
(1) 
SURPLUSES OF lHE CUSTOMS REVENUE. 
Available Isurplus of the Customs 
$ 
(1) 
-6.250,000
29.500.000 
35.300.000 
36.500.000 
45.850.000 
46.500.000 
52.900.000 
69.000.000 
72.000,000 
75.000.000 
86.500.000 
88.500.000 
91.000.000 
93.000.000 
95.000.000 
100.000.000 
100.000.000 
100.000.000 
I 08.500.000 
108.500.000 
108.500.000 
116.500.000 
etc. 
Deficit 
Service 
of consolidation 
Loan 
$ 
10.937 500 
43.750.000 
43,750.000 
43.7{>0.000 
43.750.000 
43.750.000 
43.750.000 
43.750.000 
43.750.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77,814.000 
77.814.000 
77.814.000 
77,814.000 
nil 
nil 
Deficit 
to be met from 
other sources 
$ 
17.187.000 
14.250.000 
8.450.000 
7.250.000 
2,814.000 
. . . . . .
. ' 
. . . . . .
. . . . . . 
Nett surp 
of Custo1 
2.100.0 
2.750.0 
9.650.0 
15.250.0 
28.250.0 
. . . . ' 
8.686. 
10.686. 
13.186. 
15.186.� 
17.686.
122.186. 
22.186. 
22.186. 
30.686. 
30.686. 
30.686. 
116.500. 
etc. 
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Some persons may think that the above figure3 are too optimistic. We 
believe them to be rather conservative. It must be noted for instance 
that the charges in sterling have been reckoned at ten dollars to the 
pound. If the present rate under nine dollars maintains as an average during 
the current year, the sterling charges in 1923 will amount to $52,000,000 
instead of the tabulated $ 58,000,000, a decrease of $ 6,000,000 which will almost 
entirely wipe l)Ut the initial deficit of $ 6,250,000. There is also a probability 
that the full 5 % and the 2 ½ surtax will bring in more revenue than anticipated. 
Anyway, taking the figures in table IV as they stand, the question is to 
find security for the adverse balances of the years 1923-1926 , th.at is to say in 
round figures for: 
17,000,000 in 1923 
$ 14,000,000 in 1924 
$ 8,500,000 in 1925 
$ 7,250,000 in 1926. 
If the consolidation scheme is executed, all the present indebtedness wi11 be 
included in it, and consequently all the pled!led revenues other than the Cus�oms 
will be freed from charges. More particularly, there will be no more claims 
over the surpluses of the Gabelle. It seems then that the .<:;aid surpluses could be 
given as additional guarantee for such a period of time as deemed necessary. 
A maximum of one million 500 thousand dollars per month from October 
1923 to June 1925 and one million from July 1925 till the end of 1926 would 
be sufficient. If the Government would like better to keep the Salt surpluses free 
of charges so as to be able to dispose of them, no doubt that an arrangement 
with the Chinese and Foreign Banks may be devised to that effect. Once a 
Sound scheme for a 625 millions consolidation has been agreed upon, there 
ought to be no difficulty in finding some equitable adjustment for the deficit of 
the 1923-1926 period, inasmuch as the said deficit will probably be much less in 
fact than tabulated in table IV. 
A method for meeting the possihle 1923 deficit would be to have interest on 
the new bonds ,4unning only from January 1924, the nominal capital being pro­
portionately increased. The Government might aho consider the advisability of 
altering the amortization tables of the N atiolial Cow;olidated Debt Service created 
in 1921. A two years postponement of the redemption of some of the loans 
included in that service might easily procure a balance of two or three millions a 
year in 1924 and 1925. 
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11.-Main Characteristics of the Proposed 
Consolidation Scheme. 
1° No distinction is made in the scheme bctweeu the domestic and the 
foreign indebtedness. The idea is to treat all creditors of the Chinese Govern­
ment alike and give them the same reliable security, whether they are Chinese 
citizens or firms, or nationals of Foreign Powers. It is a a question of fairness 
and justice. It is also to the best interest of the country. The purpose of the 
consolidation is to restore China's credit. Such credit would not be
restored if part of the indebtedness of the Chinese Government would remain 
unsecured, or unpaid, or irregularly paid. It has become essential for the Chin­
ese Government that the investing public should make no distinction between 
China's internal and external credit, the external credit being considered as 
sound and the internal credit as bad or doubtful. When part of the credit of a 
country is doubtful, the whole of such credit is affected thereby. The Chinege 
Government must look forward for the time when they will be able to borrow 
money without having to give specific sources of revenue as guarantee: the first 
step towards such progress is regular and punctual performance of all Gove,·n• 
ment obligatio11.�. 
2° The effect of the consolidation, when completed, will be to substitute 
the Customs Revenue and the Salt Revenue for all the other pledged revenues. 
There will be no more foreign or domestic charges on the Wine and Tobacco 
tax, on the Stamp duty, on the Octroi, on the Title Deeds tax, etc. The Chinese 
Government will recover full rights over these various sources of revenue. 
Besides, the Salt· Revenue will be pledged only for a few years and for a 
comparatively small amount, All the present creditors being satisfied, the 
Ministry of Finance shall not be any more pressed by their incessant demands 
for funds, and may devote its time and energy to the study of the most important 
financial problems. 
3° A neces ary condition for the success of any consolidation scheme based 
on the Customs Revenue is that all the nett ,·evenue after payment of the expendi­
ture of the Customs administration be appropriated by preference for the service 
of the consolidation bonds. No other expenditure to take precedence over the 
payment of interest and amortization of the said bonds. Consequently, the 
appropriations which have already been granted for the Wai Chiao Pou and for 
other such Government Departments, or which may be granted in future shall 
be paid only on the surplus remaining after payment of the interest and amortiza­
tion of the con olidation bonds. If Government expenditure of whatever sort 
were allowed to take precedence over the consolidation bonds, the security of 
these bonds would be impaired, and the whole scheme would fail. 
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Since however the result of the consolidation would be to put most of the 
Salt surpluses at the disposal of the Government, the said expenditure might be 
made payable by preference f, om the said surpluses. 
4° In connection with the above remark, it must be noted that "appro­
riations" out of the increase resulting from the full 5% tariff or out of the 
increase resulting from the 21/2 surtax are not foasible. No separate accounts 
of the increase are to be kept by the Customs administration. The pro­
ceeds of the old tariff and of the increased tariff are to be received in 
one single account since they are to be paid by the importers in a lump sum. A 
merchant who imports in 1924 articles valued $1000 will not be chara-ed by the 
Customs $35 for the old tariff, plus $15 for the full 5%, plus $25 for the 21/2 
surtax. He will be charged $75 odd and the entry in the books of the Customs 
will be an entry for $75. No subdistinctions will be made in the accounts and 
it will be impossible to charge in the accounts a particular expense to a 
pa..-tkular portion of the revenue. 
5° The question of a future increase of the tariff up to 12 ½ % as compensa­
tion for the abolition of likinhas been entirely left out of the present Memorandum. 
'fhe suppression of the likin cannot be carried out until the relations between the 
Central Government and the Provinces have been clearly defined and an agree­
ment has been reached as to which revenue shall belong to the Government and 
which to the Provinces. Besides, it is admitted thR.t the increase up to 12 ½ % 
wm only compensate for the losses resulting from the suppression of the likin, 
The reform is not intended to procure additional revenue to the State and cannot 
be used for purposes of consolidation. 
60 The question of the unpaid railway loans has also been left out of the 
Memorandum because these loans are secured on the railways themselves with 
additional specific guarantees and because their service may be met from the 
railways receipts. 
January 23rd 1923. 
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